INTRODUCTION
Managers dealing with environmental issues often encounter "wicked problems," poorly defined issues with conflicting interpretations of data, which create conflict among stakeholders who hold opposing values and missions (Mason & Mitroff, 1981) . Solutions to wicked problems tend to go awry and create more complications than solutions. This paper presents a case study that --------------------------* Umar Ghuman, Ph.D., provides insight into wicked problems based on environmental management, within the context of the organizational structure and the culture of two U.S. federal government agencies. Utilizing organizational metaphors drawn from Morgan's (2006) classic text, "Images of Organization," this paper examines two public agencies and their handling of the Kesterson incident, a biological disaster that occurred in the San Joaquin Valley of California during the 1980s. The analysis utilizes Morgan's (2006) metaphors of machine, political systems, and cultural systems to explicate the circumstances of the incident, demonstrating how hierarchical structures and opposing cultures of the two government entities exacerbated the problem into a wicked, almost intractable conflict. This paper contends that agencies that deal with constantly changing, open-ended systems are best managed using a nonlinear dynamical approach that is complementary to issues with constant flux and change. In this context, the authors contend that the organization would do best to move away from a classic machine-like, Weberian understanding of the organization, and utilize a non-linear, dynamical management systems approach that allows for the understanding of wicked problems and how to deal with such issues.
WICKED PROBLEMS AND THE TANGLED WEBS THEY WEAVE
Issues that are highly complex, contested, and involve multiple actors with multiple agendas can be considered wicked problems (Mason & Mitroff, 1981) . As Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) posit, wicked problems have certain characteristics. They are difficult to define and delineate; they are rarely completely solvable, and may even re-appear after they have been considered solved.
"Wicked problems have no technical solution, it is not clear when they are solved, and they have no right or wrong solution that may be determined scientifically. Instead, for wicked problems governance must rely on the collective judgment of stakeholders involved in a process that is experiential, interactive and deliberative" (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009, p. 553) .
In governmental settings where the issues are complex and require highly technical expertise, uncertainty can exist between the agencies grappling with finding a solution to the issue (Van Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2003) . The uncertainty can be strategic, cognitive and institutional (Van Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2003) . Strategic uncertainty exists due to the many actors involved in the process; the actors examine the problem based on their enacted perceptions of the situation, and as a result, solutions can be diverse and conflicting. Cognitive uncertainty is due to the problem being, "at the boundary of natural and social systems," i.e. hard to fully comprehend and address in a rational, linear manner (Van Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2003, p. 193) . Cognitive uncertainty happens when issues do not follow a clear cut path of cause and effect. Thus, proposed solutions are incomplete and do not address all aspects of the problem. Finally, "institutional uncertainty results from the fact that decisions are made in different places, in different policy arenas in which actors from various policy networks participate. Often, decisions are only loosely coupled and sometimes not at all" (Van Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2003, p. 194) . Such differences make it difficult for the many actors involved to engage in constructive joint action that would allow for better understanding. Thus, wicked problems may suffer from a combination of strategic, cognitive and institutional uncertainty, making them difficult to comprehend, categorize and approach from the usual linear cause-and-effect approach. This case analysis examines such an issue from the organizational metaphor perspective proposed by Morgan (2006) . Morgan's (2006) classic text on organization theory, "Metaphors of Organization," utilizes metaphorical analysis by likening the characteristics of certain kinds of organizations to easily understandable symbols such as linking hierarchical, rule based, bureaucratic organizations to machines. As Morgan (2006) points out, "all theories of organization and management are based on implicit images and metaphors that lead us to see, understand, and manage organizations in distinctive, yet partial ways" (p. 4). The metaphor creates a simplistic image that is easily comprehended and can enhance the understanding of a particular organization and how it responds to its enacted reality. Since a single metaphorical description does not reflect the complexity of an organizational issue, most issues can be examined by applying different metaphors to the issue to better reflect its complexity. As Hernes (2008) and Weick (1988) point out, metaphorical analysis is a means of "bracketing," forming an understandable boundary around an organization. This bracket is by no means comprehensive, but allows for a better grasp of the state of affairs. There may be a dominant metaphor that reflects the primary way an organization examines its stakeholders and its internal and external environment. This case study will employ metaphors from that perspective, utilizing a dominant metaphor and then other metaphors to illustrate the more salient issues. This paper will address the organizational issues affecting the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and will examine three metaphors of organization. First, the bureaucracy/hierarchy of the organization will be discussed, and how that relates to Morgan's organization as machines metaphor. Second, the FWS's bureaucratic/machine structure, its rational-linear planning strategy, and its overtly comprehensive conservation plan relate to the organizations as psychic prisons metaphor. Third, the complex interactions of these issues make intractable, wicked conflict the norm, and stakeholders exist in their own enacted perceptions of the environment, corresponding to the metaphor of organizations as cultures. Utilizing chaos theory, this paper recommends an organizational strategy for the FWS that could be aligned with its complex, uncertain environment. Table 1 explicates how Morgan's (2006) metaphors will be utilized in this case. Clarke and McCool (1996) observe that, "It is a bureaucratic organization(s) that nearly always is given the responsibility of executing federal laws" (p. 3). Such is the case with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), a bureau within the larger hierarchical structure of the Department of the Interior (see Figures 1& 2) . As Figure 2 shows, the FWS is a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy, and is coordinated through the principles of span and control and unity of command to ensure that the work of each division is as homogeneous as possible (Reed & Drabelle, 1984; Tompkins, 2005 (OPM, 2013) . Within a wildlife refuge, the manager exerts legitimate authority over a scalar chain of line and staff employees, with delegations of authority, policies and procedures, and even emergency policies clearly outlined in the thick and comprehensive Service Manual (Tompkins, 2005; USFWS, 2012) . The bureaucratic hierarchy and explicit span of control is further cemented by the habitat conservation plan, a plan that describes the long range goals, objectives, and strategies of the refuge (USFWS, 2008) .
Metaphors of Organization
The FWS's approach to habitat management for its wildlife refuges employs Gulick's (1937) management functions of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. It assumes a rational, step-by-step decision-making that does not address the complex, network-managed and crisis-laden world of wildlife management (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995; Tompkins, 2005; Morgan, 2006) . Hampered by an adherence to a linear process, decision-makers satisfice, i.e. make decisions that are good enough, thereby challenging the notion of economic man as perfectly FIGURE 2 Hierarchical Placement of the San Luis National Wildlife Refuge rational and always looking to maximize utility (Simon, 1972; 1979) . The FWS is additionally stymied by its two pronged mission, which requires it to conserve and protect vital habitat on the one hand and to promote recreational use on the other. With decision making guided by a rigid and linear habitat management plan, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is an example of Simon's (1972 Simon's ( , 1979 concept of bounded rationality and satisficing, in which the decisions made are based on incomplete information, a limited ability to explore alternatives, and an inability to "attach accurate values to outcomes" (Clarke & McCool, 1996, p. 108) .
A lack of sufficient resources restricts the FWS in its ability to conduct the scientific research necessary to provide the basis for sound habitat management, or to explore viable alternatives to environmental issues and disasters (Clarke & McCool, 1996) . A dearth of habitat specific research often renders the agency unable to "attach accurate values to outcomes" (Morgan, 2006, p. 76) . Subject to close scrutiny by the media and the public and by elected officials, the refuge manager is often caught in long and complex decision making processes in which conflict, due to the numerous stakeholders involved, can easily arise.
Metaphorical Analysis: The Dominant "Machine" Metaphor
In highly bureaucratic structures, the organization can be conceptualized as a machine, in which ends are continually connected to means, a strategy which may be beneficial to a smooth workflow, but one that enslaves employees at the expense of innovative thought (Morgan, 2006) . The earlier description of the Fish and Wildlife Service in this paper demonstrates that its highly regimented and bureaucratized organizational structure and process leads the FWS to operate like a machine. Yet, such machine-type organization is least suited to the responsiveness and equity required of organizations that require complex, innovative thought to deal with issues of environmental regulation. An agency dealing with continual change is in a constant state of flux, and a bureaucracy is the least suited organizational structure for such a complex open system (Tompkins, 2005) . The Machine Metaphor emphasizes linearity and rationality, set goals and objectives, highly specified and detailed work descriptions, and an edict of "plan, organize and control, control, control" (Morgan, 2006, p. 26) . As a result the machine-like metaphor is best suited to organizations where the tasks are straightforward, the outside environment is highly stable, and all required results are similar in nature, i.e. when the human component behaves in a predictable and required manner. Such a step by step organizational routine is ill-suited to working with an open system that exists in continuous interaction with an ever-changing environment. Rather the 'machine' complicates the decision-making process for a wildlife refuge. As is the case with biological organisms, environmentally-focused organizations rely on their environment for resources that are critical to their existence and survival. Agency resources are the key to the implementation of government policies, with budgets often determining outcomes, especially at the local level (Kraft & Furlong, 2012) . As a regulatory agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service lacks funds, staff, and autonomy in carrying out the Endangered Species Act, and like most governmental agencies, is hampered by inter-agency squabbles. While a bureaucratic organization may be well suited to a stable environment, the FWS exists in a turbulent political environment, with complex interdependent networks, while tasked with the management of ever changing biological systems.
For example, the refuge's merit-based, performance appraisal process offers instrumental rewards such as pay, promotions and plaques of recognition. However this merit based system further illustrates the difficulties involved in applying a mechanistic approach to a public organization. It is exceedingly difficult to establish and measure performance standards for the "ambiguous, intangible, and partly unattainable goals" typical of public organizations (Tompkins, 2005, p. 13) . As is the case with the FWS, goals are nebulous, as it is this agency's charge to conserve, protect, and enhance fish and wildlife. Tompkins (2005) states that merit-based personnel systems become "constraint-oriented rather than outcome oriented," further contributing to the breakdown of the machine (p. 15). Charged as it is with implementing the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a policy that exists due to species extinctions caused by habitat loss, the FWS is handcuffed by rules and regulations that deny innovation and adaptability to a rapidly changing environment (Clarke & McCool, 1996) . Additionally, as a regulatory policy, the ESA involves benefits and costs for all members of society, so the FWS is governed not only by the Department of the Interior, but by all affected parties, with the result that compromise among competing political actors can outweigh the ability of the agency to balance the conflicting interests of wildlife with the realities of merit-based personnel systems and line-item budgets (Clarke & McCool, 1996; Tompkins, 2005) . This demonstrates that decision making in such an organization, governed and influenced by multiple entities, is not the linear, step by step process that is the expected means of operation. Rather it is a process of back and forth interaction, power plays, and political schemes and satisficing. Morgan's (2006) machine metaphor demonstrates that highly structured, rule oriented, bureaucratic organizations with limited spans of control do not have the viable organizational structure to respond to complex, open, unstable environments with ever changing laws, regulations and stakeholders.
Other Metaphors: Psychic Prison and Culture A rigid bureaucratic structure, adherence to a particular style of management, strict rules and regulations, as well as devotion to the Habitat Conservation plan can be the basis for Morgan's (2006) "psychic prison" metaphor. The psychic prison metaphor is based on the premise that an organization is created and sustained by the conscious and unconscious mental processes of its members. When these processes create a dominant reality, organizational members can become trapped in the dominant, favored way of thinking that prevents questioning inefficient organizational attributes. Indoctrinated by the rules and favored ways of thinking and doing, management becomes unable to see past their version of reality. This metaphor is similar to the Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) idea of sense making and enactment; that organizational actors make "sense" of a reality that is acceptable to them within the context of institutional and environmental pressures. Though Weick et al. (2005) demonstrate that sense-making is a coping mechanism and a positive way for organizational actors to "understand" their reality, the psychic prison is construed in a negative sense: that the individual becomes trapped in a reality that he is loath to get out of. Janis (1972) terms such an illusionary bias as 'group-think'; where employees are incapable of seeing beyond their shared illusions and operating norms, and so unable to question their reality or to think critically. The FWS hampered by regulation and competing interests, exists in a highly complex environment within a contentious network of organizations. Such an organization can utilize its bureaucratic structure, rigid rules and procedures to create a stable, enacted environment; a psychic prison of a manufactured reality that it is content to remain in. Such 'created' worlds can be understood as a means of defense for the organization, since they help make sense of a highly complex and ever changing environment.
The culture of the FWS further indoctrinates employees into such a psychic prison. New employees are indoctrinated into the culture of the FWS at its National Conservation Training Center, and conduct consistent with organizational policies is further mandated by the wearing of uniforms as a condition of employment (USFWS, 2012). Subordination becomes standardized through socialization in organizational values and customs. Training, policies, and the hierarchy of command allow conscious and unconscious processes to take on a power of their own, creating a dominant version of reality further cementing the psychic prison. Bounded rationality, and the limitations of the human decision-making process aid such embedded institutionalization in organizational norms, favoring decision-making acceptable to the dominant reality. As Allison (1971, p. 81 ) points out, "…organizations develop relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, perceptions and issues… Work routines, patterns of association and information channels are manned by careerists on a structured ladder. Promotion to higher rungs is dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished devotion to a service's mission."
Utilizing the three metaphors of machine, psychic prison and culture help illustrate the FWS at the time of the Kesterson Incident. It was an organization that, as a result of rules, regulations, policies and procedures had created a dominant, stable culture; and enacted and proceeded to observe its behavior 'colored' by a dominant reality. As the Kesterson Incident demonstrates, the FWS was unable to see past its psychic prison, its bureaucratic machinery and its embedded culture to address complex, wicked problems and provide a balanced dynamic solution.
The Kesterson Tragedy: Death and Domination in the Uplands
A single event within the history of the San Luis Refuge, a refuge managed by the FWS, revealed how the agency's hierarchal structure, political weakness, and conservative attitude towards solutions debilitated the organization to the extent that it was incapable of keeping pace with the needs of the open, natural systems that it intended to protect. In 1982, biological surveys were conducted by FWS biologists, Felix Smith and Harry Ohlendorf, at the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge, in response to the discovery of hundreds of developmental abnormalities and deaths in waterbirds (Harris, 1991 , Garone 2011 ). The results indicated that selenium, a natural but toxic soil element, was bio-accumulating in the food chain of refuge species, increasing in concentration as it was passed from aquatic invertebrates to water-birds and to small mammals. The toxicity levels in certain species observed at Kesterson were in some cases a hundred times greater than those at the state Volta Wildlife area, just about six miles southwest of Kesterson. An indication of the severe limitations of the unwieldy bureaucratic structure, this information took almost a year to travel via internal memos up the FWS hierarchy until it was passed along to the Bureau of Reclamation. According to Harris (1991) , the Bureau downplayed the significance and extent of the findings and attempted to discredit the findings of two the key, nationally renowned scientists, Ohlendorf and Smith. However, with the assistance of the U.S. Geological Survey, the FWS demonstrated that the Bureau's own data was full of errors and had been collected using techniques not approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the general scientific community.
Extensive media coverage followed, as well as questions from the public and other government agencies concerning the integrity of the Department of the Interior, and growing concern that the selenium problem was not limited to the Kesterson Unit, but threatened groundwater supplies throughout Merced County, California (Harris, 1991) . In 1984, the Claus family, who owned land next to Kesterson, petitioned the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board to hold the Bureau responsible for the situation, but the board declined to take action (Garone, 2011) . With sick and deformed birds on their property (some with horrific deformities such as no beaks, no eyes, and no feet), and the sudden absence of fish and frogs, the Claus family took their plea to the State Water Resources Control Board. Required by the State board to prepare an environmental impact statement, the Bureau worked with the FWS and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to come up with four options, two of which included the flooding of Kesterson ponds with fresh water, and the other two suggesting the removal of the top six inches of soil and vegetation with either on-site or off-site disposal in a capped landfill.
With costs for the options ranging from $300,000 to $16.15 million, the Bureau was forced to consider budgetary concerns as a deciding factor in choosing among the four options; however, none of the options were found to be environmentally adequate (Garone, 2011) . Consequently the State Water Resources Control Board ordered the Bureau to apply clean soil to low lying pond areas and to areas where groundwater levels would rise seasonally. However, despite the application of over a million cubic yards of soil, the Kesterson Reservoir Biological Monitoring Program, instituted by the FWS and the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, revealed that, in the mid-2000s, selenium levels threatened reproductive abilities of numerous aquatic birds, leaving the FWS to continue to deal with this issue to this day. A California Fish and Game official, who testified during a subsequent internal investigation by the DOI, summed up the politics of the department, as follows: "Within the Department of the Interior hierarchy, the Fish and Wildlife Service is simply trampled on by the Bureau of Reclamation, generally with the support of both the Solicitor's office and a powerful western political constituency" (Sweeney, 1984, p. 238) .
Throughout the incident, the biologists who initially reported the disaster, Smith and Ohlendorf, refused to relent to the pressures placed on them by the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Bureau, long after they were forced into retirement by successive denials for promotion and transfers to remote assignments (Harris, 1991) . John Terborgh, a renowned avian ecologist, describes their forced exile as follows: "When scientists obtain results that are contrary to the goals of a bureaucratic organization, their results may be suppressed, or buried deep in a report so thick and tedious that no one reads it" (Terbogh, 1989, p. 92) . In fact, throughout the Kesterson crisis, upper-level management at the San Luis Refuge toed the conservative line, leaving field staff to pay "a personal price for upholding good science in the face of heavy political, bureaucratic, and social pressures" (Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, 1991, p. 72) . Caught between wildlife needs and its own conservative nature, the agency succumbed to the pressure of the Bureau, and ignoring warnings of extensive selenium deposits in lands neighboring the refuge, they returned to their comforting womb of rules and regulations, safe within the walls of their psychic prison.
The Kesterson Incident is a classic example of how an organization, beset by powerful bureaucratic masters and elite stakeholders, will enact a reality that is most digestible for it. The Kesterson Incident highlights the actions that the FWS could have taken that would have been aligned with its habitat conservation plan. However, the agency had to succumb to pressures from the larger bureaucracy that it was working under, a bureaucracy that was also under political pressure from other elite stakeholders. As a result, the FWS reacted by maintaining, even enforcing its psychic prison reality by not upholding the scientific data from its scientists, by burying key information, so that it did not conflict with the governmental position, and by making changes that were not viable and refusing to examine other viable options. Allison (1971) succinctly explains why such a state of affairs exists in governmental institutions:
A government consists of an established conglomerate of organizations, each with existing goals and programs, and repertoires. The characteristics of a government's action in any instance, follows from those established routines-and from the choice made by government leaders-on the basis of information and estimates provided by existing routinesamongst established programs" (p. 88).
Thus, any information that hasn't travelled through the proper channels and followed established procedural routine would be viewed with skepticism, and would be more likely to be dismissed than incorporated. Allison's (1971) statements demonstrate that, in certain instances, governmental organizations can act as almost closed systems in which the only information that is acted upon is that which proceeded through proper channels. As a result, the FWS and its larger bureaucracies created a reality and stuck to it, despite numerous erudite warnings that this enacted sense-making made little sense.
As is amply evident through the preceding discussion of the agency's bureaucratic structure, conservative culture, and incremental decision-making processes, the FWS has become an egocentric organization, one that has allowed its "Animals First!" motto to take a backseat to the maintenance of its identity as the nation's premier wildlife protection organization (USFWS, 2013). Environmental management is fraught with the uncertainty of the implications of attempting to manage complex and nonlinear systems. By fixating on the notion of who they are and maintaining it all costs, the FWS ignores the multiple systems of interaction occurring within its environment.
Rather than examining the organizational actors embroiled in the issue from a linear perspective, it would be beneficial to examine them as part of a complex system. As per Allen, Maguire, and McKelvey (2011), "A complex system is a "whole" made up of a large number of interacting "parts' or 'agents", which are each governed by some rule or force, which relates their behavior in a given time period contingently to the states of other parts" (p. 2). Complex systems have certain key characteristics. First, there is rich and varied knowledge interaction between the agents. Second, each agent interprets that interaction based on their contextualization of the issue, and responds accordingly. Third, such interactions of the involved agents, based upon multiple contexts of meaning, tend to create emergent patterns of phenomena that are difficult to predict or describe parsimoniously. Complex systems are inherently proactive and open systems; that is they seek out and incorporate new knowledge, rather than defend their current status quo. As Wheatley (1999) points out about open, proactive, complex organizations: "It (the organization) is deliberately looking for information that might threaten its stability, knock it off its balance, and open it to growth" (p. 83).
The events described in the Kesterson incident synchronize well with a complex systems understanding. There are multiple agents (stakeholders) that are interacting with distinct conceptualizations of context. Some are approaching the issue with a highly bureaucratized, psychic prison mentality of how the issue needs to be dealt with, i.e. quietly and with the least amount of disturbance of the status quo. Others are examining it within the context of an environmental disaster; a problem that requires intensive and immediate action. Yet others are contextualizing the issue in terms of how it will affect their livelihood and personal health. It seems that wicked problems such as these require a multiple systems level consideration, where seemingly opposing interpretations collide, creating an environment that seems chaotic; and yet order may emerge from such chaos. This case analysis will demonstrate how examining the Kesterson incident from a non-linear dynamical systems and chaos theory perspective would provide a solution to what seemed like a wicked, intractable conflict.
A Chaos Theory Perspective
The species that live on the San Luis Refuge exist in a circular pattern of interaction within their own populations, within the wider ecology of California's Central Valley, and within the broader ecology of the earth itself. Thus in an interconnected environmental system, all sub-systems are self-referential, and changing one aspect of a single system can affect all the interconnected system. John Muir (1911) applied this organismic view to nature, saying that, "When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe" (p. 211). Muir's words and the concept of interconnectedness ring true for the San Luis Refuge management, who are not separate from the species and ecosystems that they are charged to protect; they too are part of a collective system that is trying to 'enact' a reality that would be beneficial to all (Weick & Quinn, 1991) .
Drawing on the works of Simon (1956) , Weick (1979) , Theitart and Forgues (1996) , and Wheatley (1999) , non-linear dynamical systems and chaos theory are ways of conceptualizing an organization's interaction with its environment. An organization can be thought of as loosely coupled systems that interact with a vibrant, ever-changing environment. Small changes in the internal or external environment can correspondingly create change in one system, which in turn can affect and 'reverberate' across the many interlinked systems; and as a result magnify the event, such that "a small shift in a parameter could send the system to a very different equilibrium" (Anderson, 1999, p. 219) . A small change, like a ripple, can "… accumulate exponentially to an explosive situation" (Theitart & Forgues, 1995, p. 20) . These small changes may be thought of as creating chaos, i.e. an unpredictable state of affairs where actions and events seem haphazard and impossible to resolve. As a result one is unable to predict the turn of events that occur. However chaos theory states that events that appear to be random and unpredictable are actually deterministic, and tend to collect around an 'attractor' (Wheatley, 1999; Theitart & Forgues, 1995) .
Like the ecosystems that it protects, the Fish and Wildlife Service is characterized by interactions, both ordered and chaotic. Ordered interaction occurs when agency rules and regulations dictate how the agency deals with other agencies within the DOI, and how it negotiates with the Bureau of Reclamation for its water supply. Chaotic interactions, such as the Kesterson issue, result when the stable system experiences punctuated equilibrium, a fractured state that occurs during a period of rapid change after a long period of stability (Farazmand, 2003) . In this case the Kesterson incident is an example of an event that disrupted the long period of enacted stability. Such an event 'unbalances' the equilibrium, creating reverberations of cause and effect which, driven by positive feedback shift the entire paradigm into seeming chaos. Though the inherent nature of the system is to revert back to its original stable state of affairs, chaos theory states that a system doesn't revert back to its exact original state; rather the disruption causes a fundamental change in the system such that incorporation of the change creates a 'new' system order. Thus, order will always emerge out of chaos (Wheatley, 1999) .
The new order results due to what chaos theory terms attractors. Attractors can be considered events, actors, stakeholders, or any state of affairs that tends to 'attract' the pattern of chaos towards itself. If chaos is a series of random patterns, then attractors are those vectors with magnitude around which a random pattern begins to form a shape. Thus an attractor pulls the organization out of its existing state of equilibrium, causes a shift in momentum and the new dynamic state of the organization is formed as a result of its influence from the attractor. Chaos theorists have observed that system behaviors tend to be influenced by different attractors, some stronger than others (Wheatley, 1999; Farazmand, 2003) . Some attractors pull the system towards equilibrium or near equilibrium as a result of negative feedback loops that counteract the system's tendency to move towards chaos (Theitart & Forgues, 1995) . Other attractors, such as the Lorenz Attractor, described by mathematician Edward Lorenz, "can flip the system into new configurations," using the resources of the new attractor to change into a new, stable order (Morgan, 2006. p. 254) .
The tragedy at the Kesterson Unit illustrates the "butterfly effect, whereby a small change as insignificant as a butterfly flapping its wings in Peking can influence weather patterns in the Gulf of Mexico" (Morgan, 2006, p. 255) . At Kesterson, a change in selenium soil concentrations triggered a change in the development and mortality rates of birds, which triggered bio-magnification up the food chain, which triggered the recognition of a threat to human health on a national and continental basis. The resulting interactions between the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Reclamation pushed the FWS to an "edge of chaos" situation where the controversy between politicians, agencies, and the public provided "bifurcation points" or forks in the road to leading to different futures (Morgan, 2006) . The political might of the Bureau over the FWS acted as the old dominant attractor, which defined the context in which the alleged cover-up at Kesterson unfolded, allowing the Bureau to maintain the upper hand and leaving the FWS to revert to a variation of its former state with a diminished reputation for biological expertise and the loss of two expert biologists. As a result, due to the parochial, groupthink mentality of FWS administrators, it failed to recognize and incorporate the salience of the other attractors in the situation. The other attractors in this case were the two scientists, Smith and Ohlendorf, the Claus Family, the growing networks of environmentalist groups, the public, and the press that were worried about water contamination and the ecological disaster that was happening at Kesterson. These attractors could be considered Lorenz attractors; since they positively reinforced the initial ripple, and by incorporating the knowledge and the ideas from such actors, the FWS would have shifted to a very different state of equilibrium.
The use of chaos theory offers refuge management theorists the means to understand how embracing new attractors could have flipped the system to provide a new organizational configuration immediately following the Kesterson crisis, and how it can allow them to rethink their organization today. While acknowledging that some kind of hierarchy will always be a feature of complex systems, chaos theorists have suggested that emergent hierarchies, generated by the need to create self-organizing work teams to address the circumstances at hand, allow managers to function in the midst of complexity and flux. Refuge personnel demonstrated their ability to function as part of an inter-agency work team to manage chaos, during the Kesterson crisis, when they partnered with the U.S. Geological Survey to dispute the findings of the Bureau of Reclamation. Utilizing the expertise and resources these personnel offered could have been a turning point for the disaster. It would have demonstrated that the FWS was an open systems organization that embraced and accepted the nonlinear and dynamic environment that it operated in. As a result of such an acceptance, it would have allowed these attractors to shift the FWS into a new configuration, one which would have created a self-organizing system that would no longer be defensive, but open to change and growth. As Wheatley (1999, p. 83) points out: "Self-organizing systems are never passive, hapless victims forced to react to their own environment. As the system matures and develops self-knowledge, it becomes more adept at working with its environment. It uses available resources more effectively, sustaining and strengthening itself." Thus if the FWS incorporated a self organizing, open systems perspective, it would be able to shift its structure, processes and strategy to respond to the changes in its external environment.
Recommendations
The use of chaos theory in this case illustrates how an almost closed, top down hierarchical regimented system is ill-suited to deal with as complex an issue as the management of environmental habitats. Kaufman's (1960) seminal work detailing the frustrations of a forest ranger, echo a similar sentiment; that complex dynamic environments require open, proactive systems thinking that embrace change and incorporate new information.
Chas theorists offer a solution to this problem by describing how managers can shape and create contexts to break the hold of dominant attractor patterns in favor of new ones that will allow the agency to self-organize in a manner that flows with change (Wheatley, 1999) . The challenge is to shift the balance from a more powerful, established attractor to a new form by opening the door to instability, or by even the creating instability that will allow new attractor patterns to emerge. As Wheatley (1999) and later Morgan (2006) point out, organizations must proactively seek out and embrace information that may cause shifts in paradigms of thinking. This allows organizations to work with stakeholders to continually build upon, incorporate and institutionalize new knowledge, which in turn acts as a buffer when chaotic forces threaten to disrupt a defended equilibrium. In short, the organization needs to embrace chaos and not rigorously defend against it.
In this manner, the FWS could break away from the "mind-sets, power bases, vested interests, and existing codes of practice" within the Department of the Interior by mobilizing a powerful coalition of key partnerships to transform their conservative, politically weak agency into an autonomous and politically powerful organization. Tompkins (2005) agrees with this approach, maintaining that public agencies can balance conflicting interests by building coalitions of supporters to increase access to funds, political clout, and operating autonomy. The FWS currently maintains partnerships with other wildlife and conservation organizations, but these alliances are politically weak due to their narrow focus on a particular species. Refuge management needs to establish referent power by finding an interest group with an existing power base to represent their needs within the legislature. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (2007) report that interest groups have multiple points of access that allow them to influence government agencies through testimony and campaign contributions; by lobbying for a change of elected and appointed officials; by leveraging public opinion through the media; and by trying to change target group behavior through demonstrations or boycotts. The FWS could establish such an alliance through the use of teamwork, described by Follett as an integrative venture, "bringing together people performing different functions in an interdependent environment, discussing each other's needs, and reaching agreement about how to integrate differences" (Tompkins, 2005, p. 140) . Wildlife management personnel who work for an array of interest groups nation-wide share the agency's holographic knowledge of ecosystem functions and a holographic culture based on a shared passion for the protection of nature. By viewing their organization through the lens of other wildlife organizations, the FWS could break away from the egocentrism that prevents enactment, to an autopoietic approach that redefines agency boundaries and recognizes opportunities for change in bifurcation points along the way (Morgan, 2006) . Thus, refuge management could make one of those small changes that initiate a butterfly effect, by employing a "high-leverage initiative" that would not only increase the agency's autonomy, but would redefine its role and resurrect its reputation as a leader in wildlife management. Rather than serving a rather static and mundane function as a headquarters and museum, the refuge's new visitor's center, funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, could be turned into a national research center. By creating ties with universities through research opportunities to facilitate the double-loop learning of science, the agency could move away from the politically-based decision making that has handcuffed its access to resources. Budgetary issues could be, at least, partially resolved with soft money in the form of research grants and the coming together of groups that may have seemingly disparate goals. The wetlands of the Central Valley were saved by an unlikely pairing of duck hunters and environmentalists, and thus in such a manner, lands that are sheltered could be protected through an expanded conservation easement program with neighboring farmers and other groups that are concerned with keeping such lands as refuges for conservation and wildlife. By using environmental research to guide management decisions, the agency could then manage its boundaries by following nature's example in knowing when symbiotic relationships would facilitate a shift to new attractors and when feedback loops indicate the importance of maintaining current patterns. Wheatley's (1999) range of prescriptive strategies echo the above recommendations; recommendations that can enhance the ability of organizations that embrace non-linear dynamical systems and the chaos perspective. The three that best apply to this case are working with the whole of a system, self-learning, and making meaning and creating and fostering participative and explorative relationships.
Working with the whole of a system implies that organizations in an open environment should follow the example of an ecosystem; which thrives by recognizing and fostering dependencies amongst the different systems that interact within the ecological whole. Thus as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the FWS musty proactively work with the other organizational actors that are linked stakeholders, recognize their input, and also recognize its dependency towards these actors. Interlinked ecological systems work best through collective effort, rather than expending energy on opposing each other. Intractable conflict is an unhappy resultant when interlinked systems consider themselves 'closed-off' to each other's inputs and outputs. By recognizing the value of the 'whole' system, and working with the whole system, the dynamical equilibrium creates stronger buffers against adversarial input.
Self-learning and making meaning is similar to a prescription that Weick and Quinn (1991) also prescribe for organizations. Wheatley (1999) Thus it is able to better deal with unexpected situations because it has a large repository of institutionalized knowledge that it can utilize to understand the new stimulus.
Creating and fostering participative relationships builds on the earlier mentioned prescription of working with the system. The goals and mission of all the actors in a system are the same; for example in this case the main goals are habitat conservation, species survival and eliminating contamination.
Recognizing mutual goals by fostering participative relationships, helps build networks of trust and appreciation that untangle the webs of intractable conflict.
CONCLUSION AND AFTERMATH
This paper examines a wicked problem, a seemingly intractable issue where the resolution of the conflict may be an impossible task. However, the case study demonstrates how utilizing an open, nonlinear examination to a seemingly wicked problem allows for the recognition of solvable threads that may 'untangle' a convoluted and contorted mess.
The Kesterson tragedy increased the scrutiny of selenium contamination, and eventually in the 1980s, led to the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, and the creation of the North American Waterfowl Management Plan (NAWMP). This plan allowed for addressing the issue at a continent level, with 650 projects now underway in Canada, Mexico and the U.S., and almost 20 joint collaborative ventures that helped in the restoration and protection of wetlands across the continent (Garone, 2011) . This collaborative, and systems wide approach has been largely successful and underscores how participative management and a systems approach to intractable conflict and chaos can produce desired results. By creating rich networks of information, action, resource and response; the remaining wetlands now remain a protected ecosystem.
Chaos theory illustrates that the events and outcome of the Kesterson incident did not unfold in a linear manner, as a cause and effect relationship, with the Bureau simply dumping the selenium issue on the FWS. The incident occurred as a result of looping lines of mutual causality influenced by the political alliance between agriculturalists in the Westside Water District, a governor, and the Bureau of Reclamation; the dominance of the Bureau over the FWS; interagency relationships within the DOI; the conservative culture and psychic prison of the FWS; the hierarchical nature of the DOI and the agencies within it; and the unyielding persistence of two FWS employees and the media (Morgan, 2006) . Farazmand (2003) argues that despite the apparent ill effects of such breakdowns, chaotic changes are "healthy processes and should in fact be encouraged" (p. 351) because they offer organizations the opportunity to self-organize in the same manner as biological systems, offering, paradoxically, more order. It is this dialectical process, the discussion and reasoning that occurs during the examination of opposing thoughts that will create the negative entropy needed by the Fish and Wildlife Service to pursue the fork in the road that will allow the agency to evolve into a dynamic organization, well-equipped to deal with the complexities of its biological and political environment, and thus solving seemingly wicked problems.
